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The principles of evolutionary psychology and the traditional assumptions of 
social psychology are highly compatible. Both disciplines trace observed 
behavioral variability to situational variability. Both assume that psychological 
mechanisms sensitive to social information are central to causal accounts of 
social behavior. Questions about the origins and functions of  these 
psychological mechanism," are indispensable for understanding social behavior. 
Evolutionary psychology provides conceptual tools for addressing these 
questions. Several pitfalls must be avoided by practitioners of evolutionary 
social psychology. Specifically, we must jettison notions of genetic determinism 
and behavioral unmodifiability, eliminate false dichotomies between "genetic'" 
and "learned," and place cross-cultural variability in a sensible theoretical 
context. Attending to the reliable phenomena discovered by traditional social 
psychology and the conceptual frameworks provided by modern evolutionary 
psychology will produce the most informed evolutionary social psychology. 
Humans are perhaps the most complexly social of all animals. We live in 
groups and spend a great deal of time interacting with others, many of 
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whom we have relationships w i t h -  family members, friends, mates, and 
co-workers. The field of social psychology has successfully documented a 
number of fascinating phenomena in social interactions over the past sev- 
eral d e c a d e s -  social loafing (Latane, 1981), obedience to authority (Mil- 
gram, 1963), conformity to group judgments (Asch, 1955), the bystander 
intervention effect (Darley & Latane, 1968), the in-group/out-group dis- 
tinction (Tajfel, 1982), the self-serving bias in attribution (Zuckerman, 
1979), the effects of physical attractiveness on positive social evaluations 
(Berscheid & Walster, 1974), and many others. 
These phenomena are interesting and important in their own right, 
but they typically reside in conceptual isolation both from each other and 
from a coherent theory of social interaction. Missing from current social 
psychology is an account of the origins of these phenomena and their func- 
tions: Why do humans have psychological mechanisms that cause them to 
loaf, obey, or conform? What adaptive problems did these phenomena arise 
to solve? Why should people form relationships that endure over time? 
Why live in groups at all rather than alone in the woods? These are the 
questions that evolutionary scientists attempt to a d d r e s s -  questions about 
the origin and functions of our existing psychological mechanisms. 
At the same time, many evolutionary thinkers tend to be naive about 
the cumulative advances that psychology has made. They sometimes un- 
derestimate the complexities of social interaction, the detailed psychological 
machinery needed to process social information, the importance of proxi- 
mate causes of social behavior, and the cumulative knowledge that has ac- 
crued about social processes. These generalizations, of course, do not apply 
to all evolutionists, nor do the former generalizations apply to all social 
psychologists. There are some psychologically sophisticated evolutionists, 
just as there are some evolutionarily sophisticated social psychologists. But 
few scientists have strong expertise in both disciplines. 
In this article, I argue that evolutionary scientists and social psycholo- 
gists have much to learn from each other. Conjoining the respective 
strengths of the two disciplines will mutually enrich both fields and create 
a hybrid field--"evolutionary social psychology." In this article, I argue 
the following: 
1. Social adaptive problems were likely to have imposed the most 
important selection pressures on humans over the past several 
million years (see also Brewer & Caporael, this issue). 
2. Evolutionary psychology provides a useful framework for under- 
standing the origins of psychological mechanisms that have been 
produced by these selection pressures. 
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3. Great attention must be directed toward the complex proximate 
psychological mechanisms or "complex cognitive dynamics" (see 
Cantor, this issue) that currently underlie social processes, guided 
by an understanding of the causal processes, principally evolution 
by natural selection, that created those mechanisms. 
4. Fundamental pitfalls and misunderstandings must be avoided by 
workers in this area, as well as by critics, to arrive at a sensible 
theoretical account. 
BASIC PREMISES OF EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Evolutionary perspectives on human behavior are many and varied, 
often containing premises that contradict one another. Conceptual dis- 
agreements are reasonable as theorists struggle with how to think clearly 
about the issues, go down some blind alleys, correct previous errors, and 
successively grope toward better theoretical approximations. Because of the 
diversity of metatheoretical evolutionary assumptions (see, e.g., Brewer & 
Caporael, this issue), it is reasonable to spell out which ones are being 
adopted. 
Perhaps the most important conceptual difference among evolution- 
ary scientific views is between sociobiology (what Symons, in press calls 
"Darwinian anthropology") and the more recent formulations of evolution- 
arypsychology (see Buss, 1991; Symons, in press; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). 
Although sociobiology and evolutionary psychology share the view that hu- 
mans, including their unique adaptations, have evolved by the process of 
natural selection as currently understood in inclusive fitness terms (Ham- 
ilton, 1964), the two differ in several crucial respects. The key difference 
hinges on the assumption among many sociobiological treatments (some- 
times explicit, sometimes implicit) that humans have evolved domain-gen- 
eral goals or mechanisms to "maximize inclusive fitness" or to act "as if"  
they were maximizing their inclusive fitness. I've even heard one describe 
humans as "inclusive fitness maximizing blobs." Evolutionary psychologists, 
in contrast, believe that it is impossible in principle for natural selection 
to have created goals or mechanisms of this sort. They see this as a 
"sociobiological fallacy"--conflating a theory of the causal process that 
created human psychological mechanisms (inclusive fitness theory) with a 
theory of the nature of the mechanisms produced by that causal process 
(mechanisms that strive for inclusive fitness) (Buss, 1991). 
Evolutionary psychologists assume instead that natural selection has 
created a large number of more domain-specific psychological mechanisms, 
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each tailored to solving a particular adaptive problem. Sweat glands, for 
example, exist because those who had them successfully survived and repro- 
duced more than those who did not in the past. But sweat glands simply 
cool people down. They serve the function of thermal regulation; they do 
not "strive for fitness" or have fitness as a goal anywhere in the system, 
either consciously or unconsciously. Evolutionary psychologists view humans 
not as "fitness strivers" but rather as "adaptation executors" (Tooby & Cos- 
mides, 1990). To illustrate this difference, consider food preferences. We 
consume vast quantities of fat, sugar, and salt in fast food restaurants in 
current environments not because we are striving to replicate our genes, but 
rather because we are simply activating or "juicing" our evolved taste pref- 
erences for these substances. Current execution of these adaptations may 
even be detrimental to survival and reproduction, and hence "maladaptive" 
in current environments. These preferences evolved by the process of natural 
selection, and hence are the end products of a history of differential gene 
reproduction. But differential gene reproduction is not the "goal" of these 
preferences; it is the causal process that produced the preferences. The dif- 
ferences between the programs of evolutionary psychologists and that of 
many sociobiologists extend from basic theoretical differences about what 
has evolved all the way to empirical methods for testing evolution-based 
hypotheses, in spite of the shared "general theory" (see below) of evolution 
by natural selection. Interested readers are referred to Buss (1991), Cos- 
mides and Tooby (1987), and Symons (1990) for extended discussions of 
the programmatic differences. 
There are five basic premises that I will argue provide the foundations 
for evolutionary social psychology: 
1. All Behavior is a Product of Mechanisms Internal to the Person, Com- 
bined with Input (External and Internal) that Activates those Mechanisms. Al- 
though many of the social phenomena cited above are often viewed as "caused 
by the situation," a brief thought experiment can be used to show that a sen- 
sible causal account requires the invocation of psychological mechanisms in- 
ternal to organisms (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Symons, 1987). If human beings 
conform or obey authority, but ants and gorillas do not, in response to identical 
external inputs, then there must be something fundamental about humans psy- 
chological mechanisms that differs from those of ants or gorillas. No behavior 
can be produced in the absence of these psychological mechanisms. The "situ- 
ational fallacy" (Buss, 1991) is to assume that, because situational variance 
can "account for" behavioral variance (e.g., changes in situation can be cor- 
related with changes in the bystander intervention effect), a coherent explana- 
tory account need not involve stable psychological mechanisms residing within 
the person (e.g., information-processing decision-rules). No behavior can be 
produced in the absence of mechanisms. 
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2. Evolution by Natural Selection is the Only Known Causal Process by 
Which Complex Species-Typical Functional Mechanisms Can be Created, at 
Some Fundamental Level of Description. In the history of science, only two 
alternatives to evolution have been proposed: creationism, the notion that 
a supreme deity created life in all of its various forms, and seeding theory, 
the idea that extraterrestrial organisms planted the seeds of life on earth. 
Creationism and seeding theory, largely incapable of being verified or dis- 
proved by observation or experiment, are not scientific theories and lack 
heuristic v a l u e -  they lead to no empirical predictions. Although I have 
seen no formal studies on the matter, my hunch is that very few social 
psychologists are creationists or seeding theorists. As Symons (1987) 
phrased it, "we're all Darwinians" in the sense that we believe that humans 
evolved through a process of natural and sexual selection. The central issue, 
therefore, is not whether natural and sexual selection created human psy- 
chological mechanisms, but rather the nature of the mechanisms that these 
processes have created (Symons, 1987). 
3. Evolved Social Psychological Mechanisms Are Likely to Be Large in 
Number and Complex in Nature, and Many Will Be Domain-Specific. There 
are several rationales for this premise, but two will be mentioned, one con- 
ceptual and one empirical. Conceptually, the social adaptive problems that 
humans had to solve in their environment of evolutionary adaptedness were 
many, complex, and different from one another. A fear of snakes may solve 
the adaptive problem of avoiding a dangerous environmental hazard, but 
does nothing to solve the adaptive problem of which foods to consume 
(e.g., berries and nuts, not twigs or gravel). Similarly, solutions to the prob- 
lem of "how to attract a mate" do little to solve the problem of "how to 
socialize children." Different adaptive problems typically select for different 
adaptive solutions. As Symons (1990) argues, there is no such thing as a 
general solution because there is no such thing as a general problem. 
Mechanisms vary, of course, along many dimensions--some are 
more domain-general, others are more domain-specific; some are cogni- 
tively penetrable, others are cognitively impenetrable; some can be easily 
overridden by other mechanisms, others are more difficult to override. 
What constitutes a successful solution to an adaptive problem, however, 
differs across adaptive domains (e.g., avoiding a snake vs. selecting a mate), 
individual circumstances (e.g., presence of powerful kin and alliances vs. 
absence of social resources), different species (humans vs. spiders), different 
ages (prepubescent vs. adolescent), and different sexes (male vs. female). 
There can in principle, therefore, be no fully domain-general solution 
mechanism - -  one that can be used across all adaptive domains, by all ages, 
by all sexes, and in all individual circumstances. A carpenter's flexibility 
comes not from having a single domain-general "all purpose tool" that is 
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used to cut, poke, saw, screw, twist, wrench, plane, balance, and hammer, 
but rather from having many, more specialized, tools. It is the numerous- 
ness and specificity of the tools in the entire tool kit that give the carpenter 
great flexibility, not a highly "plastic" single tool. Similarly, the great flexi- 
bility that humans display in dealing with their social environments is due 
not to having just a few domain-general psychological mechanisms, but 
rather a large number of complex and specific ones, which can be deployed 
singly and in combination depending on circumstances. Thus, on conceptual 
grounds, evolutionary psychologists assume that because (a) adaptive prob- 
lems are many and distinct, (b) successful solutions to one problem are 
different from the solutions needed for other problems, and (c) what will 
be successful depends heavily on species, age, sex, context, and individual 
circumstances, the solution mechanisms will be numerous and complex. 
Evolutionary psychology offers a heuristic for identifying some of these hu- 
man adaptive problems (Buss, 1991). 
The second rationale for the complexity-numerousness premise is em- 
pirical. In the past 30 years, psychologists have demonstrated again and 
again violations of proposed principles of domain-generality. In learning 
theory, for example, violations of equipotentiality have been demonstrated 
by Garcia and others. Indeed, Garcia's findings at first were so startling to 
editors and reviewers of the major journals, mainly because they violated 
domain-general learning principles, that they refused to believe or to pub- 
lish them until they were replicated numerous times. We now know that 
some things are extraordinarily difficult to learn, requiring thousands of 
trials; others can be learned in a single trial. We now know that humans 
are predisposed to learn some things more readily and rapidly than other 
things (Seligman & Hagar, 1972). More people learn fears of snakes, 
heights, spiders, and darkness, for example, than fears of guns, cars, or 
electrical outlets, which are currently more hazardous u additional evi- 
dence that people are adaptation executors rather than fitness strivers (e.g., 
more people have fears of snakes than of cars, even though far more people 
die and are injured by cars than by snakes in modern environments). 
The existence of many domain-specific mechanisms, of course, does 
not rule out the possibility and even likelihood that some mechanisms will 
be relatively more domain-general such as the capacity for induction, the 
ability to perceive means-ends relationships, and perhaps the perception 
of certain forms of covariation. An evolutionary psychological perspective, 
however, suggests that the human mind cannot be solely composed of such 
mechan i sms -  most adaptive problems require more complex and dedi- 
cated psychological machinery to successfully solve. Nor will the relatively 
more domain-general mechanisms be deployed randomly; instead, these 
mechanisms are co-opted for very specific g o a l s -  forming reciprocal alli- 
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ances or friendships, selecting mates, achieving or maintaining position 
within social hierarchies, helping family members, and building coalitions, 
to name a few central social goals. 
Many of empirical findings that are compatible with domain-specific- 
ity have been discovered in the social domain, and I'll list just a small sam- 
ple of them: 
a. A nonrandom distribution of fears and phobias such as the "fear 
of strangers" that emerges reliably between 8 and 24 months of 
age (Marks, 1987). 
b. Child abuse is 40 times greater among preschool children in step- 
families than "intact" families where there are two genetic parents 
(this does not imply dedicated mechanisms for child-abuse, but 
rather may suggest the existence of mechanisms for "discrimina- 
tive parental solicitude" if other interpretations can be ruled out) 
(Wilson & Daly, 1987). 
c. Children imitate high-status models much more than low-status 
models (Bandura, 1977). 
d. Some causes of marital dissolution across cultures are highly pre- 
dictable on evolutionary psychological grounds, centering heavily 
on infidelity and infertility (Betzig, 1989). 
e. Sexual jealousy occurs in all known cultures, and is the leading 
cause of spousal homicide across cultures (suggesting not dedi- 
cated mechanisms for spousal homicide, but rather possibly, male 
mechanisms involved in "male sexual proprietariness") (Daly & 
Wilson, 1988). 
f. Men and women show consistent differences in what qualities 
they desire in potential mates, such as cues to resource invest- 
ment potential and cues to reproductive value; these differences 
are closely linked with the social adaptive problems that men and 
women have confronted in mating contexts; and these differences 
are highly consistent across cultures (Buss, 1989). 
Although not one of these findings tells a definitive story, in the ag- 
gregate they are compatible with existence of a large number of specialized 
social psychological mechanisms. The psychological mechanisms involved 
in imitating high-status models undoubtedly differ from those involved in 
avoiding strangers or selecting mates. The empirical evidence, in other 
words, can be seen as conforming to the conceptual expectations of evo- 
lutionary psychologists that numerous mechanisms have evolved because 
of the large number and extreme diversity of adaptive problems that hu- 
mans needed to solve in our evolutionary environments. 
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4. Many of the Most Important Adaptive Problems for Humans Were 
Social in Nature. As Brewer and Caporael (this issue) argue, the social 
group constituted at least one of the crucial "selection environments" for 
humans. They argue that the cooperative group may have been the primary 
survival strategy of humans, and this would have selected for adaptations 
suited for cooperative group living such as cooperativeness, loyalty, and 
fear of social exclusion (see also Alexander, 1987; Baumeister & Tice, 1990; 
Buss, 1990). Individuals whose mechanisms led them to be uncooperative, 
deviant from group norms, or disloyal presumably would have had more 
trouble surviving than those with the opposite set of mechanisms, and hence 
their mechanisms would have been selected against. 
But survival is only the beginning. Because natural selection operates 
by a process of differential reproductive success (not differential survival 
success), there are many reproductive problems that we had to solve, and 
many of these are inherently social in nature. Examples include successful 
intrasexual competition, mate selection, sexual intercourse, mate retention, 
reciprocal dyadic alliance formation, coalition building and maintenance, 
parental care and socialization, and extra-parental kin investment (Buss, 
1991). 
Humans are probably unique in the duration and complexity of social 
relationships that they form. Humans sometimes form lifelong mating re- 
lationships, develop friendships that last for decades, and maintain contact 
with their brothers, sisters, and other relatives over great expanses of time 
and distance. Because social adaptive problems were so crucial for human 
survival and reproduction, many of the most important features of our 
evolved psychological mechanisms will necessarily be social in nature. 
5. Many of the Important Social Adaptive Problems Humans Had to 
Solve Entailed the Successful Formation of Enduring Social Relationships 
Such as Mateships, Friendships, Kinships, and Coalitions. Much social psy- 
chological research has been described as the "psychology of stranger in- 
teraction." Undergraduates who have never met and who will never meet 
in the future encounter each other for brief periods in social psychological 
experiments. In everyday life, however, most of our social interactions occur 
with people with whom we have formed lasting re la t ionships-  a fact that 
is also true among contemporary hunter--gatherer groups, and was undoubt- 
edly true throughout human evolutionary history. Evolutionary psycholo- 
gists expect, therefore,  that some of the most important  evolved 
psychological mechanisms will be tailored to solving the unique adaptive 
problems associated with such relationships. I will illustrate this with a few 
e x a m p l e s -  reciprocal alliances, mateships, and parent--offspring relation- 
ships. First, however, a few words must be said about "levels of analysis" 
and the testing of evolutionary hypotheses. 
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F i g .  1 .  
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN EVOLUTIONARY 
PSYCHOLOGY 
When I give colloquia about my evolution-based research on human 
mating strategies, I am sometimes asked questions such as "What evidence 
would falsify 'the theory'" or "Doesn't the existence of people helping total 
strangers falsify 'the theory?' "In order to answer these questions, one must 
first distinguish among at least four levels of analysis (see Fig. 1). The first 
level is general evolutionary t h e o r y -  evolution by natural selection, as un- 
derstood in its modern form as inclusive fitness theory. Now, at this level, 
even though general evolutionary theory is called a "theory," it is widely 
regarded by biologists as so well established that it is simply assumed to 
be correct in its general outlines, and then work proceeds from that as- 
sumption but does not test the assumption, at least not directly. There have 
been thousands of tests of the general theory. New species can be created 
in the laboratory using its principles. Evolution by natural selection is the 
guiding metatheory for the entire field of biology. There are phenomena 
that could falsify the general theory - -  if complex life forms were found to 
be created in time periods too short for natural selection to have operated 
(e.g., in 7 days), or if adaptations were found on organisms that evolved 
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for the benefit of intrasexual competitors or for the benefit of other species. 
But no one has ever observed or documented such phenomena. 
So when an evolutionary psychologist tests an evolutionary proposition, 
she is not testing "general evolutionary theory," just as when an astronomer 
tests a particular hypothesis (e.g., about the amount of critical mass in the 
universe), she is not testing "general relativity theory" with each experiment. 
That theory is assumed to be true, just as evolution by natural selection is 
assumed to be true for the present purposes. Because creationism and seed- 
ing theory are the only alternatives that have been proposed over the past 
130 years, and because there is overwhelming evidence supporting general 
evolutionary theory, these assumptions are reasonable. 
Moving one level down, we find "middle-level evolutionary theories," 
such as the theory of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), the theory of pa- 
rental investment and sexual selection (Trivers, 1972), and many others. 
These middle-level theories are still fairly broad in that they are theories 
about entire domains of func t ion ing-  for example, the conditions under 
which parents and their offspring will conflict with one another. These theo- 
ries are fair game for testing and possible falsification. I'll examine just 
one to illustrate this p o i n t -  Trivers' theory of parental investment and 
sexual selection (see Fig. 1). 
This theory, which is itself an elaboration of Darwin's (1871) theory 
of sexual selection, provides one of the key theoretical ingredients for pre- 
dicting the operation of mate choice and the operation of intrasexual com- 
petition. Leaving aside the logical and reproductive underpinnings of 
Trivers' theory (which would require a major treatise to spell out), he es- 
sentially argued that the sex that invests more in offspring (often, but not 
always, the female) should be more choosy about mating, whereas the sex 
that invests less in offspring should be more competitive with members of 
their own sex for sexual access to the valuable high-investing opposite sex. 
A woman whose minimum parental investment includes a 9-month gesta- 
tion period, for example, would be predicted to be more choosy than a 
man whose minimum parental investment was the contribution of his 
sperm. Trivers developed additional hypotheses about the precise content 
of the mate choice--various forms of resources, for example, when certain 
contextual conditions were met such as resource defensibility, variance in 
resource holdings among potential mates, and so on. Some of the specific 
hypotheses derived from Trivers' theory are shown in Fig. 1. And specific 
predictions can be derived form each of these hypotheses--predictions 
about evolved psychological mechanisms or behavioral strategies in a par- 
ticular species. 
In testing these predictions, all the conditions of "normal paradigm 
science" hold. If the predictions do not pan out empirically, then the hy- 
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pothesis on which they were based is called into question. If key hypotheses 
are called into question by several predictive failures, then the truth or 
value (depending on one's philosophy of science) of the middle-level theory 
that generated the hypotheses is doubted. Theories that are consistently 
supported, as for example Trivers' theory of parental investment and sexual 
selection has been in thousands of empirical studies, are sometimes hailed 
as major middle-level theories, especially if they prove highly generative of 
interesting and fruitful avenues of research (and especially if the predictions 
are specific to them rather than being common to several alternative in- 
terpretations). Theories that are not generative or that produce a series of 
predictive failures are abandoned or replaced by better theories. 
This is a highly oversimplified account, of course, and several addi- 
tional levels of analysis are often involved. Evolutionary psychologists, for 
example, developed hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms that 
have evolved in humans to solve particular adaptive problems that humans 
have faced in ancestral conditions. This often involves a detailed task analy- 
sis of the sorts of information-processing mechanisms needed to solve par- 
ticular adaptive problems, conjoined with an analysis of the relevant 
ancestral cues that would have been available to organisms in those envi- 
ronments. In my work, for example, I have developed hypotheses about 
psychological mate preferences of men and women, based in part on Triv- 
ers' theory of parental investment. Some have been supported by dozens 
of studies; a few have not. But for the present purposes, the point is that 
when one asks "What evidence could falsify the theory?" one must locate 
the question in the hierarchy of levels. My particular hypothesis about a 
psychological mechanism could be wrong, even if the theory at one level 
up that led me to the hypothesis is entirely correct. As in the rest of science, 
all levels are evaluated by the cumulative weight of the e v i d e n c e -  rarely 
is a single study definitive one way or the other. 
Thus, the empirical methods used by an evolutionary psychologist to 
evaluate hypotheses and predictions are exactly the same as those used by 
other psychologists. They include experimental methods (e.g., Cosmides, 
1989; Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987), questionnaire methods (e.g., 
Buss, 1989; Kenrick, Sadalla, Groth, & Trost, t990), analysis of public docu- 
ments such as homicide statistics or divorce statistics (e.g., Betzig, 1989; 
Daly & Wilson, 1988), observational methods (e.g., Buss, 1988; Hill & 
Kaplan, 1988), psychophysiological techniques (McGuire & Troisi, 1987), 
and many others. Empirical methods, as in other areas of psychology, are 
tailored to the specific hypothesis being tested. As always, results that tran- 
scend several methods are seen as stronger than results limited to a single 
method. And results found across different populations and cultures are 
seen as stronger than results limited to a single population or culture. 
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Before leaving the "levels of analysis" issue, it should be noted that 
some evolutionary investigations take as their starting point a phenomenon 
or an observation, and then try to test hypotheses about its function or 
about why it evolved. The fact of sexual reproduction itself, for example, 
remains a major enigma to evolutionary biologists, and there are several 
competing theories about why sex evolved (e.g., Hamilton, 1980; Tooby, 
1982). No previous evolutionary theory "predicted" that sex would exist in 
advance, but the fact of its existence is fair game for subsequent evolution- 
ary analysis, just as observations in other fields (e.g., observation of galaxies 
moving away from one another in astronomy) are fair game for subsequent 
theoretical scrutiny. 
To take another example, the existence of the orgasm among women 
has provoked substantial theoretical interest among evolutionists (e.g., 
Gould, 1987; Rancour-Laferriere, 1985; Symons, 1979). Several competing 
evolutionary hypotheses have been advanced, including (1) the paternity 
confidence hypothesis, (2) the cue to selecting the right male hypothesis, 
and (3) the "sealing the pair-bond" hypothesis. At least two prominent evo- 
lutionists, in contrast, have argued that the female orgasm is not in itself 
an adaptation, but rather an incidental byproduct, much like male nipples 
apparently have no function and are incidental byproducts of the fact that 
females have nipples (Gould, 1987; Symons, 1979). The key point is that 
it is rare that one can refer to "the" evolutionary hypothesis. Just as there 
are competing theories in other areas of science, so there are often com- 
peting evolutionary hypotheses about the same set of observations. Testing 
among competing hypotheses, including hypotheses that state that the ob- 
served phenomenon is not itself an adaptation, proceeds in the same fash- 
ion as "normal paradigm science," and the nature of evidence needed 
depends on the particular subject of investigation. 
SOME EXAMPLES OF EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Let me now turn to three specific examples in which evolutionary 
psychological thinking has been applied to the analysis of social relation- 
ships. 
1. Reciprocal Alliance Formation or Friendship. Theoretical analyses 
have shown that tremendous benefits can accrue to individuals who form 
cooperative reciprocal relationships (Trivers, 1971). Costs are incurred that 
provide a larger benefit to someone else; at some later time, the recipient 
of the initial benefit bestows a benefit on the initial giver. Both individuals 
can gain by this process, above and beyond what they could have gained 
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by acting alone. Indeed, humans seem to have reached something of a pin- 
nacle of reciprocal alliance formation, something that has not escaped the 
attention of social psychologists judging by the importance of social ex- 
change and equity theories (Clark & Reis, 1988). 
One major condition limiting the evolution of reciprocal relationships, 
however, is the possibility of cheating - -  when someone fails to reciprocate 
once he or she has received the benefit from the other person (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1989). Indiscriminate cooperation under conditions that allow 
cheating would be selected against; such a strategy is vulnerable to exploi- 
tation by noncooperators. It would suffer ultimately in the currency of re- 
productive success, and hence would not evolve. Therefore, a prerequisite 
for the evolution of enduring reciprocal relationships is solving the adaptive 
problem of preventing cheating. Cosmides (1989) presents compelling ex- 
perimental evidence that people possess something like a specialized "look 
for cheaters" cognitive algorithm that governs the manner in which they 
reason about social exchange. This is just one of the many social adaptation 
problems that must be solved in order to form complex reciprocal alliances 
- - o thers  include evolved capacities to recognize different individuals, to 
remember the histories of one's interactions with different individuals, to 
communicate one's values to others, and to model the values of other in- 
dividuals (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). Forming reciprocal alliances requires 
a number of complex psychological mechanisms that are uniquely designed 
for specialized adaptive problems. 
2. Parent-Child Relationships. Parents and children share 50% of their 
genes, and so one expects on theoretical grounds that acts of altruism will 
flow from one to the other without the necessary expectation of reciprocity. 
What constitutes a "violation" in one type of relationship (e.g., failure to 
reciprocate) does not constitute a violation in parent--child relationships. 
Evolutionary psychologists expect that specialized psychological mecha- 
nisms will have evolved that are attendant upon the unique adaptive prob- 
lems that parents have confronted when interacting with their children. One 
class of solutions to these problems is subsumed by what Daly and Wilson 
(1988) call "discriminative parental solicitude." 
The tremendous surge of love that parents feel toward their children 
seems to be mitigated by a highly predictable set of conditions that is dif- 
ficult to account for on any grounds but evolutionary ones: (1) when the 
parent is not the biological parent, (2) when paternity is uncertain, (3) when 
the child is deformed or otherwise of poor phenotypic quality, and (4) when 
circumstances such as poverty, lack of food, or maternal overburdening 
from too many children render prospects for surviving and flourishing poor 
(Daly, 1989). It is precisely under these circumstances that infanticide in- 
stigated by parents is carried out, at least in traditional societies (Daly & 
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Wilson, 1988; Dickeman, 1975; Minturn & Stashak, 1982). Without these 
mitigating circumstances, parents typically invest time, energy, effort, and 
love that is probably unparalleled in any other type of human relationship. 
3. Mating Relationships. In sexually reproducing species such as ours, 
reproduction cannot occur without mating. In most cultures, the vast ma- 
jority of individuals do form mating relationships of more than a brief du- 
ration (over 90% of all people get married at some point in their lives). 
This special social relationship, however, carries unique adaptive problems 
that are not shared by other forms of social relationships. The possibility 
of sexual infidelity, at least historically, posed distinctive adaptive problems 
for men and women. Men whose mates were unfaithful risked investing in 
children who were not their own. Women whose mates were unfaithful, 
although not risking analogous maternity uncertainty, nonetheless risked 
the diversion of a man's resources to other women and their children. 
There is evidence that "sexual jealousy" evolved as a complex psychological 
solution to these problems (Daly, Wilson, & Weghorst, 1982), although as 
Cantor (this issue) points out, this is no guarantee that jealousy is currently 
sensible or adaptive. 
An interesting point is that this mechanism is irrelevant to solving 
the adaptive problems associated with friendships or kinships. What con- 
stitutes a "violation" in a long-term m a t e s h i p -  having sex with someone 
e l s e -  would not constitute a violation of a friendship, just as failure to 
reciprocate would constitute a violation of a friendship, but not of a par- 
ent--child relationship. Different relationships pose different adaptive prob- 
lems. What constitutes a successful relationship differs across relationship 
types. Thus, evolutionary psychologists expect that humans have evolved 
distinct psychological mechanisms to solve the unique adaptive problems 
associated with these different types of relationships. Some mechanisms, 
of course, may operate across c o n t e x t s -  successful status attainment, for 
example, may simultaneously attract mates and help with the provisioning 
of children. Selection of a good cooperator might be good for fi'iendships 
as well as for mateships. Mechanism specificity will occur to the degree 
that there are specific adaptive demands linked with particular types of 
relationships. 
In sum, humans form many intense, long-duration relationships that 
differ in their adaptive demands. Long-term relationships undoubtedly con- 
stituted human solutions to many of the survival and reproductive problems 
our ancestors faced. Therefore, the psychology of relationships rightly 
should occupy a central place in the evolutionary social psychology of hu- 
mans. Because the adaptive problems posed by different types of relation- 
ships were at least partially distinct from each other, solutions to one often 
do little for solutions to the others. Evolutionary psychologists anticipate 
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that there will be numerous social psychological mechanisms that have 
evolved to deal with these numerous unique complexities. 
PITFALLS OF AND PROBLEMS WITH EVOLUTIONARY 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Evolutionary theory is deceptively simple, and hence easy to misun- 
derstand. This applies to advocates of evolutionary perspectives, as well as 
to critics. In order to move beyond the stage of strident advocacy and equally 
strident criticism, it may help to identify some of the most important prob- 
lems, pitfalls, and misunderstandings linked with this enterprise. 
1. Evolutionary Theory Does Not Imply Genetic Determinism or Un- 
modifiability. Nothing except for death is inevitable and ummodifiable. Not 
even taxes are inevitable, apparently, if one is rich enough. All adaptations, 
including evolved psychological mechanisms, develop only in the context 
of certain environmental inputs. Change those inputs, and you will change 
the result of development. The last 100 years is replete with examples of 
environmental interventions that override evolved mechanisms or their 
manifest expression. We can read a report of a study that links fat con- 
sumption with heart attacks, and decide to eat less fat - -  using our concern 
with health to attenuate the activation of a food preference that evolved 
under conditions of caloric scarcity. Thus, it is a misunderstanding of evo- 
lutionary psychology to conflate "evolved" with inevitable, intractable, or 
unmodifiable. 
2. Evolutionary Psychology lnvoIves Mechanisms Responsive to Social 
Context, Environment, and Changes in External Conditions, Not "Instincts" 
That Rigidly Determine Behavior Regardless of Context. Natural selection and 
sexual selection produce mechanisms that afford organisms adaptive ad- 
vantage in dealing with the complex exigencies of their environments. Sweat 
glands get activated primarily when the external temperature increases; we 
do not sweat regardless of temperature. In the social domain, the features 
of the interactional world that humans must track and be responsive to 
are exponentially more complex than those of the physical world, and 
change greatly over time, situations, and relationships. We must be able to 
monitor, for example, our own trajectories and the trajectories of others 
- - m a t e  value trajectories, hierarchical trajectories (who is ascending and 
descending), shifts in coalitional alliances, and one's own trajectories in all 
these social relationships. Rigid, inflexible mechanisms imperious to these 
complexities would be selected against. Evolutionary psychology is centrally 
about context and environment because these external conditions define the 
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adaptive problems humans must solve, and hence the selection pressures 
for context-sensitive psychological mechanisms. 
3. The Dichotomy in the Social Sciences That Contrasts "Genetic" with 
"Learned" Is a False One, and Must be Jettisoned Before an Understanding 
of Causal Processes Can Proceed. Evolutionary psychology is often confused 
with behavioral genetics. In behavioral genetics, researchers often attempt 
to partition observed variances into "heritable" and "environmental" 
sources. In that delimited context, it makes sense to speak of something 
as being "more heritable" or "more environmental," depending on the 
weight of the evidence. 
But from the standpoint of the individual organism, considered as an 
integrated and unified collection of evolved mechanisms, the phenotype is 
equally genetic and learned. It makes no sense to separate the two, as they 
are inseparable in principle. All organisms require DNA, and they equally 
require environmental input during ontogeny to produce a phenotype. 
Whether or not something is heritable in the behavioral genetic sense of 
variance partitioning tends to be irrelevant to evolutionary analyses. 
Evolutionary psychology, therefore, has nothing to do with proving 
that something is genetic rather than learned. Instead, evolutionary psy- 
chologists tend to ask about the nature and content of learning, and the 
form of the learning mechanisms that people have evolved. Why do people 
learn fear of snakes rather than fear of cars? Why do people learn more 
from high-status models than from low-status models? Why are people 
more inclined to learn from the advice of kin than from the advice of a 
stranger or a competitor? Why do parents socialize their boys differently 
from their girls (Low, 1989)? How people learn and what they learn are 
fair game, indeed central game, for evolutionary psychological analysis. 
4. Evolutionary Psychology Does Not Imply That What Exists Ought to 
Exist (Naturalistic Fallacy). The world is filled with things that exist, but 
that we decide ought not to exist. Many diseases and parasites are "natural" 
and have evolved, but because of our values, we decide to eliminate or 
reduce them. What ought to exist is largely a matter that resides with the 
values of individuals, groups, and societies, and should be clearly separated 
from the issue of what currently exists. Evolutionary theory at its core is 
a theory of change, not a theory of stasis. Thus, it would be a grave mis- 
understanding to use the fact that something evolved as a justification that 
it must exist or should exist (although values themselves, or their pan-hu- 
man psychological underpinnings, may warrant analysis as products of evo- 
lution by natural selection). 
5. Variability Across Culture (Lack of Universality) in Manifest Behavior 
Does Not Falsify Evolutionary Psychological Hypotheses; Cross-Cultural Vari- 
ability Often Requires Explanations That Invoke Psychological Mechanisms 
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That Track Differing Contextual Input. This is one of the most commonly 
confused issues. Evolutionary psychologists typically make the crucial dis- 
tinction between (1) manifest behavior and (2) underlying evolved psycho- 
logical mechanisms. Much of the observed variability in manifest behavior 
can be traced to different environmental circumstances impinging on spe- 
cies-typical underlying mechanisms. To use a physical example, calluses are 
produced by repeated friction to the skin activating the underlying callus- 
producing mechanisms. If we observe variability across cultures in the num- 
ber and depth of calluses, we would not conclude that people in some 
cultures do not have callus-producing mechanisms. Instead, we would trace 
this manifest variability to environmental variability operating on mecha- 
nisms that all humans possess. 
Similarly, in the social domain, if we observe variability in mate pref- 
erences or in levels of sexual jealousy, an evolutionary psychologist would 
ask, "Are reliable features of the social or ecological environment being 
traced by evolved mechanisms that in the aggregate produce average dif- 
ferences between culture?" Preferences for relative plumpness vs. thinness 
in a mate, for example, vary somewhat across cultures (Symons, 1979). This 
variability turns out to be highly predictable from the scarcity of food re- 
sources in the environment. In cultures where food is scarce, relative 
plumpness tends to be valued, and indeed is associated with higher status, 
better health, and a resource-rich kin network in both sexes. In cultures 
that have greater food abundance, mate preferences tend to run toward 
the slimmer end of dimension (Symons, 1979), although even in our culture, 
where fatness is not valued, men generally express a preference for women 
of medium body builds, not thin builds. Nisbett (this issue) provides an 
intriguing example of variability in male competitiveness among culture, 
hypothesizing that different elements in the human strategic repertoire are 
evoked, depending on the ease of access to food resources. 
Thus, it is an error to see cross-cultural variability at the level of mani- 
fest behavior as somehow in opposition to evolutionary psychological hy- 
potheses. Cultures vary in at least some ways that are predictable from the 
reigning features of ecological and social contexts. Cultures provide input 
into psychological mechanisms, often variable input. This cross-cultural 
variability gives us an important avenue for exploring the design features 
of our evolved social psychological mechanisms, many of which evolved pre- 
cisely to track that variability in contextual input. 
The crucial point is that evolutionary psychologists, like many cogni- 
tive psychologists, distinguish between evolved mechanisms, environmental 
input into the mechanisms, and behavior that is a joint product of the input 
and the operation of the mechanisms on the input. In evaluating cross-cul- 
tural evidence, one must be careful about the level of description. Evolu- 
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tionary psychologists, for the most part, anticipate universality of evolved 
psychological mechanisms, so evidence that members of some cultures en- 
tirely lacked a particular mechanism (e.g., a sexual jealousy mechanism in 
males) would falsify a particular evolutionary hypothesis. In contrast, evo- 
lutionary psychologists predict that manifest behavior will vary considerably 
across cultures because of variable input to the mechanisms (e.g., preva- 
lence of jealousy-inducing cues; degree to which males invest in one mate 
and her offspring). Thus, variability in manifest behavior would not, in it- 
self, falsify an evolutionary hypothesis, unless the behavior varied in ways 
that contradicted hypotheses about the manner in which the mechanism is 
proposed to operate. 
6. Evolutionary Psychological Hypotheses, If  Formulated Precisely, Can 
Be Tested Empirically. Evolutionary approaches to human behavior are 
sometime accused of proposing a large number of hypotheses, some of 
them highly speculative with few empirical tests to back them up. There 
is undoubtedly some truth to this criticism. Fortunately, it is also becoming 
less true rapidly - -  the number of empirical articles on human evolution- 
ary hypotheses has increased dramatically over the past 5 years (e.g., 
Betzig, 1989; Buss, 1989; Cosmides, 1989; Cunningham, 1986; Daly & Wil- 
son, 1988; Gangestad & Simpson, 1990; Kenrick et al., 1990; Langois & 
Roggman, 1990; Low, 1989; Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Snyder, Simpson, & 
Gangestad, 1986). 
Like hypotheses in all areas of psychology, some are formulated pre- 
cisely, others sloppily; some are easily testable, others less so; some accrue 
powerful empirical support, others little or no support. It is important, 
therefore, to evaluate each evolutionary psychological hypothesis on its own 
merits. The hypothesis that men will have mechanisms to detect when 
women are ovulating, for example, is eminently testable and indeed has 
been tested. But it appears to be wrong-- there  is no evidence that men 
can detect ovulation (Symons, 1990). On the other hand, the hypothesis 
that women value cues to resources and resource acquisition in potential 
mates has received repeated empirical confirmation from many investiga- 
tors across many cultures (e.g., Betzig, 1989; Buss, 1989; Townsend, 1989). 
As noted in the discussion of "levels of analysis," one must be clear about 
the consequences of a particular predictive confirmation or failure. 
Because behavior leaves no fossils, how can we test hypotheses in 
evolutionary social psychology? Fortunately, living humans probably con- 
stitute our most important and revealing source of e v i d e n c e -  all people 
are living fossils with complex design features that are records of prior se- 
lection pressures. Our current psychological mechanisms provide a window 
into our past (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Just as our callus-producing 
mechanisms tell us that our ancestors faced the adaptive problem of r e -  
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peated friction to the skin, the widespread fears of snakes, heights, and 
strangers tells us that these were likely to have been important hazards for 
our evolutionary ancestors. Our heightened sensitivity to nonreciprocators 
suggests the importance of cooperation in human evolutionary history. The 
great upset evoked by marital infidelity reveals the importance of enduring 
committed mating relationships. Existing psychological mechanisms - -  their 
complex design features and their economy and efficiency for solving cer- 
tain adaptive p r o b l e m s -  provide us with one window through which our 
selective past can be seen. 
Sophistication about testing evolutionary hypotheses, although still far 
from ideal, is increasing rapidly. It is far from ideal in the sense that some 
investigators are excessively vague about what mechanisms they are pro- 
posing have evolved, often conflating evolved psychological mechanisms 
and manifest behavior, and resorting instead to imprecise notions of human 
behavior as being "adaptive." As a consequence, the "evidence" that is 
sometimes used, such as correlating given characteristics with current re- 
productive success, is inherently ambiguous and uninformative (Symons, 
1990). 
But sophistication is improving rapidly, as scientists clarify their think- 
ing and deploy with increasing precision empirical methods for testing spe- 
cific evolutionary psychological hypotheses. Fortunately for the proposed 
integration with social psychology, precisely the same methodological tools 
that social psychologists have developed can be used. What we will change 
is not our methods, but the questions that are p o s e d -  questions about 
social psychological mechanisms, informed by an understanding of the 
adaptive problems they may have been designed to solve in the environ- 
ments in which we evolved. 
7. Although Evolution Is a Simple process, Its Application to Human 
P~ychology Will Be Difficult. Evolutionary social psychology will not be easy. 
We will require a deep understanding of evolutionary biology, including 
knowledge of the rich set of theories about function. We also need knowl- 
edge of human ancestral conditions, knowledge of different cultures includ- 
ing contemporary hunter-gatherer cultures, and knowledge of other species 
for comparative analysis. Keen insight into the unique social problems that 
our human ancestors and their ancestors faced will come in part from this 
broader contextual and historical perspective. Social psychologists can offer 
sophistication about the information-processing constraints involved in car- 
rying out certain social strategies and methodological sophistication to trans- 
late specific evolutionary hypotheses into empirical programs of research. 
These are formidable hurdles for any scientist, and all the more so for those 
who lack training in the requisite fields. But there are no real alternatives 
for developing a deep and lasting evolutionary social psychology. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The assumptions of traditional social psychologists and evolutionary 
psychologists are highly c o m p a t i b l e -  they both seek to trace observed 
variability in manifest behavior to environmental or situational variability. 
Implicit in most social psychological accounts are underlying species-typical 
psychological mechanisms that are sensitive to situational information. Evo- 
lutionary psychologists add to this scientific quest by trying to be explicit 
about these psychological mechanisms, the causal processes that produced 
them, and the functions they were designed to serve. 
Social psychology will be enriched, not diminished, by adding this ad- 
ditional layer of causal understanding. As Nisbett (this issue) points out, we 
have a great deal to gain by making use of the conceptual tools of evolu- 
tionary psychology. Questions about the origins of social psychological 
mechanisms need to be asked, even if our current answers are incomplete: 
Where did we come from, why do we liave the social psychological mecha- 
nisms we have, what are their functions, and what are the crucial environ- 
mental inputs that activate or deactivate them? Evolutionary psychology will 
be enriched by attending to the fascinating panoply of reliable 'phenomena 
that social psychology has discovered, and to the rich set of methods the 
field has developed to study them. It is that mutual enrichment that ulti- 
mately will produce the most informed evolutionary social psychology. 
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